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Institutional ownership roughly stable: -0.26% change quarter-over-quarter.
Data as of Q1 2026
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Total shares institutions bought (green) vs sold (red) each quarter across all holders.
Inferred from quarter-over-quarter change in each fund's 13F position (new stakes count as buys, exits as sells). Not tick-level trades.
Solve the discounted cash flow backwards, then stress-test the assumptions.
A reverse DCF cannot be solved for BAFN: its net cash ($207M) exceeds its market value, so enterprise value is negative. Discounting a positive cash-flow stream always gives a positive number, so no growth rate reaches that target. This is common for banks, brokers and payment companies, where customer balances sit in the cash line and are not the company's to spend.
2-stage DCF · 0.00B shares · net debt -$207M
mean -11.7% · volatility σ 12% · implied rate exceeded in 4/4 yrs
Central path = implied -60.0%/yr growth; shaded band = ±1σ (12%) of this company's historical FCF volatility, widening with time. The wider the band, the less certain the growth.
Reverse DCF: rather than guessing a fair value, we solve for the growth the current price implies, then you stress-test the assumptions. Enterprise value of the FCF stream, less net debt, ÷ shares. Educational — not a recommendation.
Total return (dividends reinvested) vs the market, from quarter-end prices.
Above 0 = ahead of the S&P 500 since the window start; below 0 = behind. Rising means it's pulling ahead.
How far the stock fell below its prior peak. Deeper, longer drawdowns = a rougher ride to the same return.
Quarter-end, dividend-adjusted (total return). Beta & volatility from quarterly returns (annualized). Benchmark is the S&P 500 (SPY total return). Annual returns compound the quarters ending in each calendar year; the first and last years in a window may be partial. Past performance doesn't predict future results.
Top 16 institutional holders — bubble size is position value, color is the move since last quarter. Hover any holder for detail.
Drag any bubble to rearrange · size = dollar value of the position
EOD close · as of 2026-09-17
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2025
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest Expense | — | — | $32.1M | $8.6M | $7.3M | $10.3M |
| Pretax Income | -$30.8M | $17.0M | $8.0M | $7.0M | $11.7M | $15.8M |
| Income Tax Expense | -$7.9M | $4.3M | $2.1M | $1.6M | $2.7M | $3.1M |
| Net Income | -$22.9M | $12.6M | $5.7M | -$349K | $24.6M | $12.7M |
| Per Share | ||||||
| EPS (Basic) | $-5.93 | $2.68 | $1.16 | $-0.29 | $6.21 | $3.45 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-5.93 | $2.62 | $1.12 | $-0.22 | $5.91 | $3.01 |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Basic) | 4.1M | 4.1M | 4.1M | 4.0M | 3.8M | 3.4M |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Diluted) | 4.1M | 4.6M | 4.6M | 4.2M | 4.1M | 4.0M |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
Is the value real, and is the business safe? Academic scores + earnings quality + solvency, from SEC filings.
3/5 of the 9 checks — 4 couldn't be scored (see above), so the score is out of the 5 with data.
Insufficient balance-sheet detail (needs retained earnings, working capital, equity).
Needs granular two-year detail (receivables, PP&E, D&A, SG&A) — not fully reported.
Cash-conversion data unavailable. Lower/negative accruals = higher quality (Sloan).
Coverage data unavailable.
F-Score (0–9 fundamental momentum), Altman Z (distress risk), and Beneish M (earnings-manipulation screen) are academic models computed from the SEC filings. Screens and context — educational, not recommendations.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
The dividend is comfortably covered — only 0% of free cash flow, leaving room to grow it and fund buybacks. Last year: $663000 dividends + $335000 buybacks = $998000 returned on $285M FCF.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
How management deployed cash over 6 years — and what it earned on reinvestment.
A reinvestment story — most cash went back into growth rather than to shareholders.
Insufficient data. Current ROIC on all capital: -26%. Rough measure (includes maintenance capex).
Cash uses aggregated from the SEC cash-flow statement over 6 fiscal years. "Return on reinvestment" is a rough proxy — operating-income change ÷ cumulative CapEx + M&A — and includes maintenance capex. Educational — not a recommendation.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Insufficient EBITDA/debt history.
Green ≤ 1.5× · amber ≤ 3× · red > 3× (leverage relative to cash earnings).
Interest expense isn't separately reported — often netted into “other income (expense), net.” Interest last disclosed in FY2023 (no longer broken out).
Cash vs short-term debt unavailable.
Short-term / long-term split not separately reported.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-09-17
No standout strengths flagged.
Where each multiple sits in its own 6-yr range · 17th pct blended
Dot = today · shaded = middle 50% · line = median. Lower percentile = cheaper vs its own 6-yr history.
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2025 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
Watch the leverage lever — a chunk of ROE comes from the balance sheet.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
Year-by-year maturities aren't in SEC companyfacts (footnote-only), so this shows the debt/cash structure and net leverage instead.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
Operating leverage needs meaningful revenue change.
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on BAFN: price, valuation, headline fundamentals, and an auto-generated scorecard from SEC filings. Flags are rule-based signals, not recommendations.
Ranked against 838 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-03-31.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPM | $941.8B | 17.4× | — | 5.2× | 2.8% | — | 31.3% | 15.7% | 13.4% | — | 4,823 |
| V | $694.5B | — | — | 17.4× | 11.3% | — | 50.1% | 52.9% | 31.8% | — | 4,229 |
| MA | $512.0B | 34.3× | — | 15.6× | 16.4% | — | 45.6% | 193% | 56.0% | — | 3,430 |
| BAC | $419.6B | 15.3× | — | 3.7× | 6.8% | — | 27.0% | 10.1% | 4.9% | — | 3,337 |
| GS | $282.1B | 18.5× | — | — | — | — | — | 13.7% | 3.6% | — | 2,857 |
| WFC | $268.7B | 13.9× | — | — | — | — | — | 11.8% | 5.7% | — | 2,691 |
| AXP | $213.5B | 20.2× | — | 5.2× | 6.4% | — | 26.2% | 32.4% | 11.9% | — | 2,787 |
| TYFG | $191.9B | 14.2× | — | 11135.5× | 10.2% | — | 79.3% | 8.7% | 8.7% | — | 1 |
| SCHW | $188.8B | 22.5× | — | 7.9× | 22.0% | — | 37.0% | 17.9% | 17.9% | — | 2,225 |
| HDB | $173.4B | 21.8× | — | 6.8× | 15.2% | — | 30.8% | 8.8% | 4.5% | — | 570 |
| UBS | $169.2B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 660 |
| BLK | $163.4B | 29.9× | — | 6.8× | 89.3% | — | 22.9% | 9.9% | 8.1% | — | 2,196 |
| GLD | $134.4B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 3,072 |
| CB | $133.7B | 13.3× | — | 2.3× | 6.5% | — | 17.4% | 14.0% | 11.3% | — | 2,002 |
| PGR | $126.8B | 11.3× | — | 1.4× | 16.3% | — | 12.9% | 37.3% | 37.3% | — | 1,685 |
| SPGI | $120.7B | 27.6× | 17.3× | 7.9× | 7.9% | 70.2% | 29.2% | 14.4% | 10.1% | 1.7× | 2,005 |
| HOOD | $97.6B | 53.6× | — | 21.8× | 51.6% | — | 42.1% | 20.6% | 20.6% | — | 1,230 |
| CME | $97.5B | 24.3× | — | 15.0× | 6.4% | — | 62.5% | 14.2% | 14.2% | — | 1,699 |
| USB | $96.4B | 13.0× | — | 3.4× | 4.4% | — | 26.4% | 11.6% | 9.2% | — | 1,901 |
| BX | $93.9B | 32.4× | — | 6.5× | 9.2% | — | 20.9% | 34.8% | 14.2% | — | 2,037 |
| PNC | $91.9B | 14.0× | — | 4.0× | 7.2% | — | 30.3% | 11.5% | 5.9% | — | 1,839 |
| AMUB | $89.8B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 7 |
| KKR | $87.5B | — | — | 4.5× | -11.0% | — | 12.2% | 7.7% | 7.7% | — | 1,216 |
| ICE | $86.9B | 26.6× | 20.6× | 6.9× | 7.5% | — | 26.2% | 11.5% | 6.8% | 3.8× | 1,641 |
| MRSH | $84.7B | 20.7× | 15.4× | 3.1× | 10.3% | — | 15.4% | 27.2% | 11.9% | 3.0× | 1,471 |
| BAFN | $37M | — | — | — | — | — | — | -26.2% | -26.2% | — | 15 |
Peers = companies sharing BAFN's sector (Financial Services) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.