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Insufficient data to determine institutional momentum.
Data as of Q1 2026
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Top 1 institutional holders — bubble size is position value, color is the move since last quarter. Hover any holder for detail.
Drag any bubble to rearrange · size = dollar value of the position
Total shares institutions bought (green) vs sold (red) each quarter across all holders.
Inferred from quarter-over-quarter change in each fund's 13F position (new stakes count as buys, exits as sells). Not tick-level trades.
Solve the discounted cash flow backwards, then stress-test the assumptions.
A reverse DCF cannot be solved for BBXIA: its net cash ($88M) exceeds its market value, so enterprise value is negative. Discounting a positive cash-flow stream always gives a positive number, so no growth rate reaches that target. This is common for banks, brokers and payment companies, where customer balances sit in the cash line and are not the company's to spend.
2-stage DCF · 0.01B shares · net debt -$88M
mean -149.3% · volatility σ 107% · implied rate exceeded in 1/3 yrs
Central path = implied -60.0%/yr growth; shaded band = ±1σ (107%) of this company's historical FCF volatility, widening with time. The wider the band, the less certain the growth.
Reverse DCF: rather than guessing a fair value, we solve for the growth the current price implies, then you stress-test the assumptions. Enterprise value of the FCF stream, less net debt, ÷ shares. Educational — not a recommendation.
Is the value real, and is the business safe? Academic scores + earnings quality + solvency, from SEC filings.
2/6 of the 9 checks — 3 couldn't be scored (see above), so the score is out of the 6 with data.
Insufficient balance-sheet detail (needs retained earnings, working capital, equity).
Needs granular two-year detail (receivables, PP&E, D&A, SG&A) — not fully reported.
Cash-conversion data unavailable. Lower/negative accruals = higher quality (Sloan).
Interest coverage is thin — monitor.
F-Score (0–9 fundamental momentum), Altman Z (distress risk), and Beneish M (earnings-manipulation screen) are academic models computed from the SEC filings. Screens and context — educational, not recommendations.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
No dividend to cover. Last year: $0 dividends + $4M buybacks = $4M returned on -$41M FCF.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
How management deployed cash over 7 years — and what it earned on reinvestment.
A reinvestment story — most cash went back into growth rather than to shareholders.
Operating income fell despite reinvestment — a warning on capital productivity. Current ROIC on all capital: -26%. Rough measure (includes maintenance capex).
Cash uses aggregated from the SEC cash-flow statement over 7 fiscal years. "Return on reinvestment" is a rough proxy — operating-income change ÷ cumulative CapEx + M&A — and includes maintenance capex. Educational — not a recommendation.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Cash of $88M covers the $11M due within a year 8.2× over. Scheduled principal only (excludes interest & revolver draws). As of 2024-12-31 (10-K).
Insufficient EBITDA/debt history.
Green ≤ 1.5× · amber ≤ 3× · red > 3× (leverage relative to cash earnings).
Thin coverage — earnings barely cover interest.
Cash vs short-term debt unavailable.
Short-term / long-term split not separately reported.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Maturity ladder from the SEC long-term-debt repayment schedule. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-09-17
No standout strengths flagged.
Where each multiple sits in its own 5-yr range · 0th pct blended
Dot = today · shaded = middle 50% · line = median. Lower percentile = cheaper vs its own 5-yr history.
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2024 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
Watch the leverage lever — a chunk of ROE comes from the balance sheet.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
Year-by-year maturities aren't in SEC companyfacts (footnote-only), so this shows the debt/cash structure and net leverage instead.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
Profit and sales moved in opposite directions this year.
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2018 | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SG&A | 44.0 | 44.6 | 38.1 | 24.2 | 34.0 | 33.9 | 44.2 |
| Operating Income | -8.4 | -4.7 | -31.8 | 9.3 | 0.7 | -11.3 | -20.3 |
| Income Tax | 1.4 | 4.1 | -6.5 | 5.5 | 4.4 | -0.5 | 2.5 |
| Net Income | -4.4 | 6.7 | -24.4 | 15.0 | 8.2 | -5.2 | -20.8 |
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on BBXIA: price, valuation, headline fundamentals, and an auto-generated scorecard from SEC filings. Flags are rule-based signals, not recommendations.
EOD close · as of 2026-09-17
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2024
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | FY2019 | FY2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $307.3M 100.0% | $401.3M 100.0% | $342.0M 100.0% | $313.6M 100.0% | $173.2M 100.0% | $203.7M 100.0% | $208.6M 100.0% |
| Selling, General & Admin | $135.7M 44.2% | $136.1M 33.9% | $116.2M 34.0% | $76.0M 24.2% | $66.0M 38.1% | $90.8M 44.6% | $91.8M 44.0% |
| Total Operating Expenses | $369.6M 120.3% | $446.5M 111.3% | $339.5M 99.3% | $284.6M 90.7% | $228.3M 131.8% | $213.2M 104.7% | $226.1M 108.4% |
| Operating Income | -$62.4M -20.3% | -$45.2M -11.3% | $2.5M 0.7% | $29.0M 9.3% | -$55.1M -31.8% | -$9.5M -4.7% | -$17.6M -8.4% |
| Interest Expense | $3.1M 1.0% | $3.1M 0.8% | $2.4M 0.7% | $1.4M 0.5% | $237K 0.1% | $433K 0.2% | $803K 0.4% |
| Other Income (Expense), net | $2.7M 0.9% | $4.0M 1.0% | $964K 0.3% | $341K 0.1% | $290K 0.2% | $665K 0.3% | $277K 0.1% |
| Pretax Income | -$56.9M -18.5% | -$21.7M -5.4% | $42.8M 12.5% | $64.2M 20.5% | -$58.3M -33.7% | $29.0M 14.2% | -$3.0M -1.4% |
| Income Tax Expense | $7.7M 2.5% | -$2.1M -0.5% | $15.1M 4.4% | $17.2M 5.5% | -$11.2M -6.5% | $8.3M 4.1% | $2.9M 1.4% |
| Net Income | -$63.9M -20.8% | -$20.8M -5.2% | $28.0M 8.2% | $46.9M 15.0% | -$42.3M -24.4% | $13.7M 6.7% | -$9.2M -4.4% |
| Per Share | |||||||
| EPS (Basic) | $-4.67 | $-1.44 | $1.81 | $2.63 | $-2.19 | — | — |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-4.67 | $-1.44 | $1.81 | $2.63 | $-2.19 | — | — |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Basic) | 13.7M | 14.4M | 15.5M | 17.8M | 19.3M | — | — |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Diluted) | 13.7M | 14.4M | 15.5M | 17.8M | 19.3M | — | — |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
Total return (dividends reinvested) vs the market, from quarter-end prices.
Above 0 = ahead of the S&P 500 since the window start; below 0 = behind. Rising means it's pulling ahead.
How far the stock fell below its prior peak. Deeper, longer drawdowns = a rougher ride to the same return.
Quarter-end, dividend-adjusted (total return). Beta & volatility from quarterly returns (annualized). Benchmark is the S&P 500 (SPY total return). Annual returns compound the quarters ending in each calendar year; the first and last years in a window may be partial. Past performance doesn't predict future results.
Ranked against 838 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-03-31.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPM | $941.8B | 17.4× | — | 5.2× | 2.8% | — | 31.3% | 15.7% | 13.4% | — | 4,823 |
| V | $694.5B | — | — | 17.4× | 11.3% | — | 50.1% | 52.9% | 31.8% | — | 4,229 |
| MA | $512.0B | 34.3× | — | 15.6× | 16.4% | — | 45.6% | 193% | 56.0% | — | 3,430 |
| BAC | $419.6B | 15.3× | — | 3.7× | 6.8% | — | 27.0% | 10.1% | 4.9% | — | 3,337 |
| GS | $282.1B | 18.5× | — | — | — | — | — | 13.7% | 3.6% | — | 2,857 |
| WFC | $268.7B | 13.9× | — | — | — | — | — | 11.8% | 5.7% | — | 2,691 |
| AXP | $213.5B | 20.2× | — | 5.2× | 6.4% | — | 26.2% | 32.4% | 11.9% | — | 2,787 |
| TYFG | $191.9B | 14.2× | — | 11135.5× | 10.2% | — | 79.3% | 8.7% | 8.7% | — | 1 |
| SCHW | $188.8B | 22.5× | — | 7.9× | 22.0% | — | 37.0% | 17.9% | 17.9% | — | 2,225 |
| HDB | $173.4B | 21.8× | — | 6.8× | 15.2% | — | 30.8% | 8.8% | 4.5% | — | 570 |
| UBS | $169.2B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 660 |
| BLK | $163.4B | 29.9× | — | 6.8× | 89.3% | — | 22.9% | 9.9% | 8.1% | — | 2,196 |
| GLD | $134.4B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 3,072 |
| CB | $133.7B | 13.3× | — | 2.3× | 6.5% | — | 17.4% | 14.0% | 11.3% | — | 2,002 |
| PGR | $126.8B | 11.3× | — | 1.4× | 16.3% | — | 12.9% | 37.3% | 37.3% | — | 1,685 |
| SPGI | $120.7B | 27.6× | 17.3× | 7.9× | 7.9% | 70.2% | 29.2% | 14.4% | 10.1% | 1.7× | 2,005 |
| HOOD | $97.6B | 53.6× | — | 21.8× | 51.6% | — | 42.1% | 20.6% | 20.6% | — | 1,230 |
| CME | $97.5B | 24.3× | — | 15.0× | 6.4% | — | 62.5% | 14.2% | 14.2% | — | 1,699 |
| USB | $96.4B | 13.0× | — | 3.4× | 4.4% | — | 26.4% | 11.6% | 9.2% | — | 1,901 |
| BX | $93.9B | 32.4× | — | 6.5× | 9.2% | — | 20.9% | 34.8% | 14.2% | — | 2,037 |
| PNC | $91.9B | 14.0× | — | 4.0× | 7.2% | — | 30.3% | 11.5% | 5.9% | — | 1,839 |
| AMUB | $89.8B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 7 |
| KKR | $87.5B | — | — | 4.5× | -11.0% | — | 12.2% | 7.7% | 7.7% | — | 1,216 |
| ICE | $86.9B | 26.6× | 20.6× | 6.9× | 7.5% | — | 26.2% | 11.5% | 6.8% | 3.8× | 1,641 |
| MRSH | $84.7B | 20.7× | 15.4× | 3.1× | 10.3% | — | 15.4% | 27.2% | 11.9% | 3.0× | 1,471 |
| BBXIA | $51M | — | — | 0.2× | -23.4% | — | -20.8% | -26.0% | -26.0% | — | 1 |
Peers = companies sharing BBXIA's sector (Financial Services) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.