Loading institutional data...
Loading institutional data...
Institutional distribution: ownership decreased -2.08% quarter-over-quarter.
Data as of Q1 2026
Loading snapshot...
Loading financials...
Loading valuation...
Loading quality & risk...
Loading dividends & returns...
Loading capital allocation...
Loading debt & leverage...
Loading performance...
Loading peer comparison...
Loading ownership map...
Loading crowding analysis...
Loading conviction analysis...
Loading buy/sell flow...
Loading ownership trends...
Loading top holders...
Loading top holders...
Solve the discounted cash flow backwards, then stress-test the assumptions.
This company doesn't have positive free cash flow, so a reverse DCF can't be run.
Is the value real, and is the business safe? Academic scores + earnings quality + solvency, from SEC filings.
3/8 of the 9 checks — 1 couldn't be scored (see above), so the score is out of the 8 with data.
Safe > 2.99 · grey 1.81–2.99 · distress < 1.81
Eight indices comparing this year to last (receivables, margins, asset quality, growth, accruals, leverage). Above −1.78 suggests possible manipulation; below −2.22 is clean.
A screen, not proof — high growth alone can raise it.
Cash-conversion data unavailable. Lower/negative accruals = higher quality (Sloan).
Coverage data unavailable.
F-Score (0–9 fundamental momentum), Altman Z (distress risk), and Beneish M (earnings-manipulation screen) are academic models computed from the SEC filings. Screens and context — educational, not recommendations.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
No dividend to cover. Last year: $0 dividends + $0 buybacks = $0 returned.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
How management deployed cash over 4 years — and what it earned on reinvestment.
A reinvestment story — most cash went back into growth rather than to shareholders.
Operating income fell despite reinvestment — a warning on capital productivity. Current ROIC on all capital: 21%. Rough measure (includes maintenance capex).
Cash uses aggregated from the SEC cash-flow statement over 4 fiscal years. "Return on reinvestment" is a rough proxy — operating-income change ÷ cumulative CapEx + M&A — and includes maintenance capex. Educational — not a recommendation.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Insufficient EBITDA/debt history.
Green ≤ 1.5× · amber ≤ 3× · red > 3× (leverage relative to cash earnings).
Thin coverage — earnings barely cover interest. Interest last disclosed in FY2024 (no longer broken out).
Cash vs short-term debt unavailable.
Short-term / long-term split not separately reported.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-09-17
Where each multiple sits in its own 4-yr range · 0th pct blended
Dot = today · shaded = middle 50% · line = median. Lower percentile = cheaper vs its own 4-yr history.
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2025 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
Returns are margin-driven, not leverage-driven — higher quality.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
Year-by-year maturities aren't in SEC companyfacts (footnote-only), so this shows the debt/cash structure and net leverage instead.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
Low operating leverage — profit tracks sales closely (stable, less cyclical).
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cost of Revenue | 90.6 | 101.5 | 106.9 | 103.3 |
| Gross Profit | 9.4 | -1.5 | -6.9 | -3.3 |
| R&D | 0.6 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 2.7 |
| SG&A | 42.2 | 94.9 | 76.7 | 95.3 |
| Operating Income | -35.4 | -102.4 | -89.6 | -109.7 |
| Income Tax | 0.0 | 0.0 | — | — |
| Net Income | -35.4 | -103.3 | -90.8 | 50.0 |
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on JTAI: price, valuation, headline fundamentals, and an auto-generated scorecard from SEC filings. Flags are rule-based signals, not recommendations.
EOD close · as of 2026-09-17
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2025
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $9.2M 100.0% | $14.0M 100.0% | $12.2M 100.0% | $21.9M 100.0% |
| Cost of Revenue | $9.5M 103.3% | $15.0M 106.9% | $12.4M 101.5% | $19.8M 90.6% |
| Gross Profit | -$300K -3.3% | -$965K -6.9% | -$179K -1.5% | $2.1M 9.4% |
| Research & Development | $244K 2.7% | $162K 1.2% | $161K 1.3% | $137K 0.6% |
| Selling, General & Admin | $8.7M 95.3% | $10.8M 76.7% | $11.6M 94.9% | $9.2M 42.2% |
| Total Operating Expenses | $9.8M 106.4% | $11.6M 82.7% | $12.3M 101.0% | $9.8M 44.8% |
| Operating Income | -$10.1M -109.7% | -$12.6M -89.6% | -$12.5M -102.4% | -$7.7M -35.4% |
| Interest Expense | — | $167K 1.2% | $104K 0.8% | — |
| Interest & Investment Income | — | — | — | $4K 0.0% |
| Other Income (Expense), net | $14.7M 159.7% | -$167K -1.2% | -$103K -0.8% | $3 0.0% |
| Pretax Income | $4.6M 50.0% | -$12.7M -90.8% | -$12.6M -103.3% | -$7.7M -35.4% |
| Income Tax Expense | — | — | $2K 0.0% | $2K 0.0% |
| Net Income | $4.6M 50.0% | -$12.7M -90.8% | -$12.6M -103.3% | -$7.7M -35.4% |
| Per Share | ||||
| EPS (Basic) | $1.52 | $-47.93 | $-450.34 | $-1.75 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.33 | $-47.93 | $-450.34 | $-1.75 |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Basic) | 3.0M | 279K | 28K | 4.4M |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Diluted) | 13.8M | 279K | 28K | 4.4M |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
Total return (dividends reinvested) vs the market, from quarter-end prices.
Above 0 = ahead of the S&P 500 since the window start; below 0 = behind. Rising means it's pulling ahead.
How far the stock fell below its prior peak. Deeper, longer drawdowns = a rougher ride to the same return.
Quarter-end, dividend-adjusted (total return). Beta & volatility from quarterly returns (annualized). Benchmark is the S&P 500 (SPY total return). Annual returns compound the quarters ending in each calendar year; the first and last years in a window may be partial. Past performance doesn't predict future results.
Ranked against 743 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-03-31.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSM | $10.83T | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 3,121 |
| NVDA | $5.20T | 43.6× | 39.0× | 24.1× | 65.5% | 71.1% | 55.6% | 76.3% | 72.4% | 0.1× | 5,582 |
| AAPL | $4.91T | 44.6× | 34.3× | 11.8× | 6.4% | 46.9% | 26.9% | 152% | 68.1% | 0.6× | 5,858 |
| MSFT | $3.64T | 27.3× | 19.3× | 11.0× | 17.8% | 67.9% | 40.3% | 30.2% | 27.7% | 0.2× | 5,944 |
| AVGO | $1.61T | 71.2× | 63.6× | 25.2× | 23.9% | 67.8% | 36.2% | 28.4% | 15.8% | 2.5× | 4,442 |
| MU | $1.04T | 122.1× | 57.5× | 27.8× | 48.9% | 39.8% | 22.8% | 15.8% | 12.9% | 0.7× | 2,894 |
| AMD | $835.4B | 193.4× | 197.6× | 24.1× | 34.3% | 49.5% | 12.5% | 6.9% | 6.5% | 0.8× | 3,059 |
| INTC | $504.6B | — | 62.9× | 9.6× | -0.5% | 34.8% | -0.5% | -0.2% | -0.2% | 5.5× | 2,495 |
| CSCO | $426.7B | 42.3× | 35.8× | 7.5× | 5.3% | 64.9% | 18.0% | 21.7% | 13.6% | 2.3× | 3,560 |
| PLTR | $416.9B | 276.7× | 288.5× | 93.2× | 56.2% | 82.4% | 36.3% | 22.0% | 22.0% | — | 2,883 |
| DELL | $367.3B | 64.9× | 34.6× | 3.2× | 18.8% | 20.0% | 5.2% | -240% | 20.4% | 2.8× | 1,564 |
| LRCX | $341.6B | 64.9× | 54.5× | 18.5× | 23.7% | 48.7% | 29.1% | 54.3% | 37.4% | 0.7× | 2,500 |
| AMAT | $329.4B | 48.0× | 37.9× | 11.6× | 4.4% | 48.7% | 24.7% | 34.3% | 25.9% | 0.8× | 2,826 |
| RPAY | $325.1B | — | — | 1051.3× | -1.2% | 75.0% | -83.0% | -53.0% | -28.2% | -1.7× | 142 |
| UMC | $283.0B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 302 |
| SAP | $261.9B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 794 |
| ARM | $259.6B | 287.0× | 223.6× | 52.8× | 22.8% | 97.5% | 18.4% | 10.9% | 10.9% | — | 730 |
| PANW | $250.9B | 234.8× | 156.8× | 27.2× | 14.9% | 73.4% | 12.3% | 14.5% | 14.5% | — | 2,374 |
| ANET | $248.2B | 71.8× | 62.7× | 27.6× | 28.6% | 64.1% | 39.0% | 28.4% | 28.4% | — | 1,930 |
| TXN | $236.9B | 47.8× | 31.2× | 13.4× | 13.0% | 57.0% | 28.3% | 30.7% | 16.5% | 1.8× | 2,345 |
| CRM | $232.8B | 32.1× | 25.2× | 5.6× | 9.6% | 77.7% | 18.0% | 12.6% | 10.1% | 1.5× | 2,547 |
| IBM | $222.5B | 21.3× | — | 3.3× | 7.6% | 58.2% | 15.7% | 32.4% | 11.3% | — | 3,351 |
| SNDK | $221.9B | — | — | 30.2× | 10.4% | 30.1% | -22.3% | -17.8% | -14.8% | -1.5× | 1,127 |
| QCOM | $198.5B | 36.9× | 14.9× | 4.5× | 13.7% | 55.4% | 12.5% | 26.1% | 15.4% | 1.1× | 2,611 |
| MRVL | $194.6B | 74.8× | 127.2× | 23.8× | 42.1% | 51.0% | 32.6% | 18.7% | 14.2% | 2.9× | 1,477 |
| JTAI | $18M | 3.9× | — | 1.9× | -34.6% | -3.3% | 50.0% | 20.9% | 20.9% | — | 14 |
Peers = companies sharing JTAI's sector (Technology) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.