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Institutional accumulation: ownership increased +0.78% quarter-over-quarter.
Data as of Q1 2026
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Total shares institutions bought (green) vs sold (red) each quarter across all holders.
Inferred from quarter-over-quarter change in each fund's 13F position (new stakes count as buys, exits as sells). Not tick-level trades.
Solve the discounted cash flow backwards, then stress-test the assumptions.
To be worth $14.06 today, the market must believe free cash flow compounds -9.0%/yr for a decade (off $7M normalized FCF).
The market's -9.0% is more conservative than its 4-yr track record.
2-stage DCF · 0.01B shares · net debt -$34M
mean -16.0% · volatility σ 113% · implied rate exceeded in 1/3 yrs
Central path = implied -9.0%/yr growth; shaded band = ±1σ (113%) of this company's historical FCF volatility, widening with time. The wider the band, the less certain the growth.
Reverse DCF: rather than guessing a fair value, we solve for the growth the current price implies, then you stress-test the assumptions. Enterprise value of the FCF stream, less net debt, ÷ shares. Educational — not a recommendation.
Total return (dividends reinvested) vs the market, from quarter-end prices.
Above 0 = ahead of the S&P 500 since the window start; below 0 = behind. Rising means it's pulling ahead.
How far the stock fell below its prior peak. Deeper, longer drawdowns = a rougher ride to the same return.
Quarter-end, dividend-adjusted (total return). Beta & volatility from quarterly returns (annualized). Benchmark is the S&P 500 (SPY total return). Annual returns compound the quarters ending in each calendar year; the first and last years in a window may be partial. Past performance doesn't predict future results.
Top 21 institutional holders — bubble size is position value, color is the move since last quarter. Hover any holder for detail.
Drag any bubble to rearrange · size = dollar value of the position
Is the value real, and is the business safe? Academic scores + earnings quality + solvency, from SEC filings.
5/6 of the 9 checks — 3 couldn't be scored (see above), so the score is out of the 6 with data.
Insufficient balance-sheet detail (needs retained earnings, working capital, equity).
Needs granular two-year detail (receivables, PP&E, D&A, SG&A) — not fully reported.
Cash-conversion data unavailable. Lower/negative accruals = higher quality (Sloan).
Coverage data unavailable.
F-Score (0–9 fundamental momentum), Altman Z (distress risk), and Beneish M (earnings-manipulation screen) are academic models computed from the SEC filings. Screens and context — educational, not recommendations.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
No dividend to cover. Last year: $0 dividends + $0 buybacks = $0 returned on $4M FCF.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
How management deployed cash over 6 years — and what it earned on reinvestment.
A cash-return story — far more went to shareholders than back into the business (mature, low-reinvestment).
Insufficient data. Current ROIC on all capital: -0%. Rough measure (includes maintenance capex).
Cash uses aggregated from the SEC cash-flow statement over 6 fiscal years. "Return on reinvestment" is a rough proxy — operating-income change ÷ cumulative CapEx + M&A — and includes maintenance capex. Educational — not a recommendation.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Insufficient EBITDA/debt history.
Green ≤ 1.5× · amber ≤ 3× · red > 3× (leverage relative to cash earnings).
Interest expense isn't separately reported — often netted into “other income (expense), net.” Interest last disclosed in FY2023 (no longer broken out).
Cash vs short-term debt unavailable.
Short-term / long-term split not separately reported.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-09-18
No standout strengths flagged.
Where each multiple sits in its own 4-yr range · 100th pct blended
Dot = today · shaded = middle 50% · line = median. Lower percentile = cheaper vs its own 4-yr history.
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2025 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
Watch the leverage lever — a chunk of ROE comes from the balance sheet.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
Year-by-year maturities aren't in SEC companyfacts (footnote-only), so this shows the debt/cash structure and net leverage instead.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
Operating leverage needs meaningful revenue change.
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income Tax | -197.3 | -74.0 | 50.2 | 370.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| Net Income | -43.9 | -19.0 | 9.3 | -1465.6 | -308.2 | -153.2 |
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on NSTS: price, valuation, headline fundamentals, and an auto-generated scorecard from SEC filings. Flags are rule-based signals, not recommendations.
EOD close · as of 2026-09-18
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2025
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $252K 100.0% | $256K 100.0% | $270K 100.0% | $291K 100.0% | $289K 100.0% | $255K 100.0% |
| Interest Expense | — | — | $1.5M 558.5% | $764K 262.5% | — | — |
| Pretax Income | -$386K -153.2% | -$789K -308.2% | -$3.0M -1095.6% | $173K 59.5% | -$269K -93.1% | -$615K -241.2% |
| Income Tax Expense | $0 0.0% | $0 0.0% | $999K 370.0% | $146K 50.2% | -$214K -74.0% | -$503K -197.3% |
| Net Income | -$386K -153.2% | -$789K -308.2% | -$4.0M -1465.6% | $27K 9.3% | -$55K -19.0% | -$112K -43.9% |
| Per Share | ||||||
| EPS (Basic) | $-0.08 | $-0.16 | $-0.79 | $0.01 | — | — |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Basic) | 4.9M | 4.9M | 5.0M | 4.7M | — | — |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
Ranked against 838 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-03-31.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPM | $942.8B | 17.5× | — | 5.2× | 2.8% | — | 31.3% | 15.7% | 13.4% | — | 4,823 |
| V | $691.4B | — | — | 17.3× | 11.3% | — | 50.1% | 52.9% | 31.8% | — | 4,229 |
| MA | $511.5B | 34.2× | — | 15.6× | 16.4% | — | 45.6% | 193% | 56.0% | — | 3,430 |
| BAC | $416.4B | 15.2× | — | 3.7× | 6.8% | — | 27.0% | 10.1% | 4.9% | — | 3,337 |
| GS | $279.3B | 18.4× | — | — | — | — | — | 13.7% | 3.6% | — | 2,857 |
| WFC | $266.3B | 13.8× | — | — | — | — | — | 11.8% | 5.7% | — | 2,691 |
| AXP | $213.7B | 20.3× | — | 5.2× | 6.4% | — | 26.2% | 32.4% | 11.9% | — | 2,787 |
| TYFG | $191.9B | 14.2× | — | 11135.5× | 10.2% | — | 79.3% | 8.7% | 8.7% | — | 1 |
| SCHW | $189.9B | 22.6× | — | 7.9× | 22.0% | — | 37.0% | 17.9% | 17.9% | — | 2,225 |
| HDB | $177.2B | 22.3× | — | 6.9× | 15.2% | — | 30.8% | 8.8% | 4.5% | — | 570 |
| UBS | $169.4B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 660 |
| BLK | $165.9B | 30.3× | — | 6.8× | 89.3% | — | 22.9% | 9.9% | 8.1% | — | 2,196 |
| GLD | $135.3B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 3,072 |
| CB | $133.2B | 13.3× | — | 2.2× | 6.5% | — | 17.4% | 14.0% | 11.3% | — | 2,002 |
| PGR | $125.2B | 11.1× | — | 1.4× | 16.3% | — | 12.9% | 37.3% | 37.3% | — | 1,685 |
| SPGI | $121.1B | 27.6× | 17.3× | 7.9× | 7.9% | 70.2% | 29.2% | 14.4% | 10.1% | 1.7× | 2,005 |
| HOOD | $106.5B | 58.5× | — | 23.8× | 51.6% | — | 42.1% | 20.6% | 20.6% | — | 1,230 |
| CME | $99.3B | 24.7× | — | 15.2× | 6.4% | — | 62.5% | 14.2% | 14.2% | — | 1,699 |
| USB | $96.1B | 13.0× | — | 3.4× | 4.4% | — | 26.4% | 11.6% | 9.2% | — | 1,901 |
| BX | $93.6B | 32.3× | — | 6.5× | 9.2% | — | 20.9% | 34.8% | 14.2% | — | 2,037 |
| PNC | $92.3B | 14.1× | — | 4.0× | 7.2% | — | 30.3% | 11.5% | 5.9% | — | 1,839 |
| AMUB | $89.5B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 7 |
| ICE | $88.2B | 26.9× | 20.9× | 7.0× | 7.5% | — | 26.2% | 11.5% | 6.8% | 3.8× | 1,641 |
| KKR | $88.1B | — | — | 4.5× | -11.0% | — | 12.2% | 7.7% | 7.7% | — | 1,216 |
| MRSH | $84.9B | 20.8× | 15.5× | 3.1× | 10.3% | — | 15.4% | 27.2% | 11.9% | 3.0× | 1,471 |
| NSTS | $74M | — | — | 293.6× | -1.6% | — | -153% | -0.5% | -0.5% | — | 21 |
Peers = companies sharing NSTS's sector (Financial Services) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.