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Institutional ownership roughly stable: -0.36% change quarter-over-quarter.
Data as of Q1 2026
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Total shares institutions bought (green) vs sold (red) each quarter across all holders.
Inferred from quarter-over-quarter change in each fund's 13F position (new stakes count as buys, exits as sells). Not tick-level trades.
Solve the discounted cash flow backwards, then stress-test the assumptions.
The answer is outside the range this solves over (-60% to +100%/yr), so it is reported as off the scale rather than as a rate. The price is below what this cash flow is worth even under collapse.
2-stage DCF · 0.02B shares · net debt -$117M
mean 6.0% · volatility σ 55% · implied rate exceeded in 9/9 yrs
Central path = implied -60.0%/yr growth; shaded band = ±1σ (55%) of this company's historical FCF volatility, widening with time. The wider the band, the less certain the growth.
Reverse DCF: rather than guessing a fair value, we solve for the growth the current price implies, then you stress-test the assumptions. Enterprise value of the FCF stream, less net debt, ÷ shares. Educational — not a recommendation.
Is the value real, and is the business safe? Academic scores + earnings quality + solvency, from SEC filings.
3/5 of the 9 checks — 4 couldn't be scored (see above), so the score is out of the 5 with data.
Insufficient balance-sheet detail (needs retained earnings, working capital, equity).
Needs granular two-year detail (receivables, PP&E, D&A, SG&A) — not fully reported.
Cash-conversion data unavailable. Lower/negative accruals = higher quality (Sloan).
Coverage data unavailable.
F-Score (0–9 fundamental momentum), Altman Z (distress risk), and Beneish M (earnings-manipulation screen) are academic models computed from the SEC filings. Screens and context — educational, not recommendations.
What the company returns to shareholders — and whether it's covered by cash.
The dividend is comfortably covered — only 15% of free cash flow, leaving room to grow it and fund buybacks. Last year: $2M dividends + $3M buybacks = $4M returned on $11M FCF.
Yields use the latest fiscal-year dividends/buybacks over current market cap. Dividends and buybacks from the SEC cash-flow statement; payout coverage vs net income and free cash flow. Educational — not a recommendation.
How management deployed cash over 10 years — and what it earned on reinvestment.
A cash-return story — far more went to shareholders than back into the business (mature, low-reinvestment).
Insufficient data. Current ROIC on all capital: -3%. Rough measure (includes maintenance capex).
Cash uses aggregated from the SEC cash-flow statement over 10 fiscal years. "Return on reinvestment" is a rough proxy — operating-income change ÷ cumulative CapEx + M&A — and includes maintenance capex. Educational — not a recommendation.
How much the company owes, how it's trended, and how comfortably it's serviced.
Insufficient EBITDA/debt history.
Green ≤ 1.5× · amber ≤ 3× · red > 3× (leverage relative to cash earnings).
Interest expense isn't separately reported — often netted into “other income (expense), net.” Interest last disclosed in FY2024 (no longer broken out).
Cash vs short-term debt unavailable.
Short-term / long-term split not separately reported.
Debt, cash, interest and equity from the SEC balance sheet & income statement. Effective rate = interest ÷ average debt. Educational — not a recommendation.
EOD close · as of 2026-09-17
How a revenue dollar becomes profit — FY2026
Each value shows its share of revenue below it (common-size).
| Line Item | FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | FY2019 | FY2018 | FY2017 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest Expense | — | — | $18.5M | $4.1M | $2.2M | $3.4M | $4.8M | $2.8M | $2.3M | $1.9M |
| Pretax Income | -$5.8M | $6.2M | $4.6M | $23.7M | $28.3M | $13.5M | $20.6M | $22.4M | $18.0M | $10.8M |
| Income Tax Expense | -$1.5M | $1.3M | $802K | $5.6M | $6.5M | $3.0M | $4.8M | $5.1M | $7.8M | $3.4M |
| Net Income | -$4.3M | $4.9M | $3.8M | $18.1M | $21.8M | $10.5M | $15.7M | $17.3M | $10.2M | $7.4M |
| Per Share | ||||||||||
| EPS (Basic) | $-0.21 | $0.23 | $0.18 | $0.84 | $0.98 | $0.47 | $0.69 | $0.76 | $0.45 | $0.33 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.21 | $0.23 | $0.18 | $0.83 | $0.98 | $0.47 | $0.69 | $0.76 | $0.45 | $0.33 |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Basic) | 20.8M | 21.1M | 21.1M | 21.6M | 22.2M | 22.3M | 22.7M | 22.6M | 22.5M | 22.5M |
| Weighted Avg Shares (Diluted) | 20.8M | 21.1M | 21.1M | 21.6M | 22.2M | 22.3M | 22.7M | 22.7M | 22.6M | 22.5M |
Source: SEC EDGAR XBRL filings (annual, fiscal year). Quarterly flow items are derived from cumulative filings; balance-sheet figures are as-of each period end. Ratios and margins are computed, not reported.
Top 40 institutional holders — bubble size is position value, color is the move since last quarter. Hover any holder for detail.
Drag any bubble to rearrange · size = dollar value of the position
Total return (dividends reinvested) vs the market, from quarter-end prices.
Above 0 = ahead of the S&P 500 since the window start; below 0 = behind. Rising means it's pulling ahead.
How far the stock fell below its prior peak. Deeper, longer drawdowns = a rougher ride to the same return.
Quarter-end, dividend-adjusted (total return). Beta & volatility from quarterly returns (annualized). Benchmark is the S&P 500 (SPY total return). Annual returns compound the quarters ending in each calendar year; the first and last years in a window may be partial. Past performance doesn't predict future results.
EOD close · as of 2026-09-17
No standout strengths flagged.
Nothing notable to watch.
Where each multiple sits in its own 15-yr range · 67th pct blended
Dot = today · shaded = middle 50% · line = median. Lower percentile = cheaper vs its own 15-yr history.
Is the profit real, and how strong is the balance sheet?
FY2026 · every deduction from revenue to net income
DuPont — the three levers
Watch the leverage lever — a chunk of ROE comes from the balance sheet.
What the company owes vs. what it holds
Year-by-year maturities aren't in SEC companyfacts (footnote-only), so this shows the debt/cash structure and net leverage instead.
Latest year: profit growth vs revenue growth
Operating leverage needs meaningful revenue change.
Each line as % of revenue — the trend in color
| % of revenue | FY2019 | FY2020 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|
Green = margin-favorable vs the row's own range · red = unfavorable.
The metrics that matter, over time
A 30-second read on RVSB: price, valuation, headline fundamentals, and an auto-generated scorecard from SEC filings. Flags are rule-based signals, not recommendations.
Ranked against 838 sector peers with collected financials. Valuation from latest close × latest fiscal-year fundamentals; 13F conviction as of 2026-03-31.
Percentile is “goodness” within the peer set (100 = best). For valuation and leverage that means cheaper / less-levered ranks higher.
| Company | Mkt cap ▼ | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/S | Rev gr | Gross | Net | ROE | ROIC | Net D/EBITDA | 13F |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| JPM | $941.8B | 17.4× | — | 5.2× | 2.8% | — | 31.3% | 15.7% | 13.4% | — | 4,823 |
| V | $692.5B | — | — | 17.3× | 11.3% | — | 50.1% | 52.9% | 31.8% | — | 4,229 |
| MA | $512.0B | 34.3× | — | 15.6× | 16.4% | — | 45.6% | 193% | 56.0% | — | 3,430 |
| BAC | $419.6B | 15.3× | — | 3.7× | 6.8% | — | 27.0% | 10.1% | 4.9% | — | 3,337 |
| GS | $282.1B | 18.5× | — | — | — | — | — | 13.7% | 3.6% | — | 2,857 |
| WFC | $269.2B | 13.9× | — | — | — | — | — | 11.8% | 5.7% | — | 2,691 |
| AXP | $213.5B | 20.2× | — | 5.2× | 6.4% | — | 26.2% | 32.4% | 11.9% | — | 2,787 |
| TYFG | $191.9B | 14.2× | — | 11135.5× | 10.2% | — | 79.3% | 8.7% | 8.7% | — | 1 |
| SCHW | $189.7B | 22.6× | — | 7.9× | 22.0% | — | 37.0% | 17.9% | 17.9% | — | 2,225 |
| HDB | $173.4B | 21.8× | — | 6.8× | 15.2% | — | 30.8% | 8.8% | 4.5% | — | 570 |
| UBS | $168.5B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 660 |
| BLK | $163.4B | 29.9× | — | 6.8× | 89.3% | — | 22.9% | 9.9% | 8.1% | — | 2,196 |
| GLD | $134.4B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 3,072 |
| CB | $133.7B | 13.3× | — | 2.3× | 6.5% | — | 17.4% | 14.0% | 11.3% | — | 2,002 |
| PGR | $127.2B | 11.3× | — | 1.4× | 16.3% | — | 12.9% | 37.3% | 37.3% | — | 1,685 |
| SPGI | $121.5B | 27.8× | 17.4× | 7.9× | 7.9% | 70.2% | 29.2% | 14.4% | 10.1% | 1.7× | 2,005 |
| HOOD | $97.6B | 53.6× | — | 21.8× | 51.6% | — | 42.1% | 20.6% | 20.6% | — | 1,230 |
| CME | $97.5B | 24.3× | — | 15.0× | 6.4% | — | 62.5% | 14.2% | 14.2% | — | 1,699 |
| USB | $95.6B | 12.9× | — | 3.3× | 4.4% | — | 26.4% | 11.6% | 9.2% | — | 1,901 |
| BX | $93.9B | 32.4× | — | 6.5× | 9.2% | — | 20.9% | 34.8% | 14.2% | — | 2,037 |
| PNC | $91.7B | 13.9× | — | 4.0× | 7.2% | — | 30.3% | 11.5% | 5.9% | — | 1,839 |
| AMUB | $89.8B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 7 |
| KKR | $87.5B | — | — | 4.5× | -11.0% | — | 12.2% | 7.7% | 7.7% | — | 1,216 |
| ICE | $86.9B | 26.6× | 20.6× | 6.9× | 7.5% | — | 26.2% | 11.5% | 6.8% | 3.8× | 1,641 |
| MRSH | $84.7B | 20.7× | 15.4× | 3.1× | 10.3% | — | 15.4% | 27.2% | 11.9% | 3.0× | 1,471 |
| RVSB | $116M | — | — | — | — | — | — | -3.0% | -3.0% | — | 82 |
Peers = companies sharing RVSB's sector (Financial Services) with collected SEC financials. Multiples use the most recent end-of-day close and latest fiscal-year fundamentals (trailing, not forward). Missing cells mean the peer never reported that line item, has no collected price, or has a non-positive denominator. Not investment advice.